The members of the US Senate and House of Representatives have gone on summer recess for a few weeks after pushing through a revised antiterrorism bill which, among many other things, will force the air cargo industry to get all cargo inspected before it can be loaded on passenger aircraft andfreighters.
As the impact of this security document is likely to be massive, it is probably a good time to analyse the consequences of this bill, which has meanwhile been signed into law by US President George W. Bush. Although the general consensus is that security for both passengers and pilots is of vital importance to the safe and secure transport of cargo, the sweeping measures announced in the bill have alarmed a number of trade groups.
In a nutshell, the groups fear chaos, delays and unrealistic increases in handling costs and transport rates.The most vocal opposition among the trade organisations is the International Cargo Security Council (ICSC), which said it is opposed to the 100 percent screening of all inbound air and sea cargo the legislation requires. ICSC is a non-profi t organisation comprised of companies, individuals and government agencies involved in the safe and secure transport of cargo.
ICSC stated that the security bill will add uncertainty and cost to the international supply chain, severely impacting the fl ow of legitimate trade, but with little demonstrable improvement in security. In the past, the US Chamber of Commerce has lobbied against air cargo screening measures and companies like Wal-Mart have vigorously opposed ship cargo screening.
Another organisation which is opposed to the 100 percent inspection of US-bound containers is the National Retail Federation of the US, an umbrella group which represents all major US importers and retailers.
In Europe, the Global Shippers Forum (GSF) has voiced “grave concerns” about the cargo scanning mandates in the new US security law. GSF claims that 100 percent scanning will result in enormous costs to consumers without accomplishing what the requirements seek to achieve. Likewise, leading German maritime politicians have joined the line-up of those rejecting plans to introduce 100 percent scanning of US-bound containers.
With so much opposition and at the same time uncertainty about the effectiveness of the existing scanning technologies, will this security bill really make a lot of difference in creating a safer environment for travellers and crews? Or are alternatives devised by the industry, such as the “Known Shipper” programme, or a further expansion of the C-TPAT model, which to a large degree are already in place, viable options to avoid the earlier mentioned chaos?
The US Transportation Security Administration (TSA) already has its robust layered security regime in operation and is instituting another layer of security by establishing screening requirements for indirect air carriers, while it is also imposing new security screening measures on certain shipment types that are higher risk.
What counts in the end is not what the paranoid politicians in Washington DC concoct for the US and the rest of the world as adequate security measures, but the experience-based alternatives that the industry has created which are devoid of ulterior political motives.